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INTRODUCTION 
ecently, state governments have passed increasing amounts of 
legislation regulating immigration in areas ranging from housing 
to employment. According to the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, states introduced 1,607 bills or resolutions dealing with 
immigrants and refugees in 2011.1 That is 200 more bills and 
resolutions than were introduced in 2010 and 1,300 more bills and 
resolutions than were introduced in 2005.2 Several of the state bills 
introduced in the last few years included provisions dealing with E-
Verify, the internet-based system through which employers can 
confirm new hires’ work-authorization status. In 2011 and 2012, 
thirteen states introduced bills or executive orders that required the 
use of E-Verify for either the first time or for a wider range of 
employers than previously required.3 Prior to 2011, twelve states had 
laws or executive orders requiring the use of E-Verify.4 Additionally, 
two states had laws placing limitations on the use of E-Verify.5 
With states passing more immigration laws, the number of 
challenges to those laws has also risen.6 Civil rights groups and 
immigrant rights groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union 
and the National Immigration Law Center, have led some of these 
	
1 Brooke Meyer et al., Immigration Policy Report: 2011 Immigration-Related Laws and 
Resolutions in the States (Jan. 1–Dec. 7, 2011), NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-immigration-legislation-report-dec-2011 
.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). 
2 Joy Segreto et al., Immigration Policy Report: 2011 Immigration-Related Laws and 
Resolutions in the States (January-June), NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 19, 
2011) http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-immigration-laws-january-to-june  
-2011.aspx. 
3 Ann Morse et al., E-Verify FAQ, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www 
.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/everify-faq.aspx (last updated Dec. 18, 2012). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Meyer et al., supra note 1. 
R
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challenges.7 These challengers have employed several tactics to 
combat laws they view to be anti-immigrant in establishment and 
effect. These tactics include challenging the laws on grounds such as 
preemption, equal protection, and judicial awareness. 
While the laws range in coverage from education to health, this 
Comment focuses on lawsuits challenging immigration laws in the 
employment context. Part I of this Comment gives an overview of 
federal immigration laws that regulate employment. Part II covers 
cases involving challenges to employment immigration laws, 
including the recent United States Supreme Court case, Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States v. Whiting.8 Part III looks at the 
effects of recent court decisions and legislation. Finally, Part IV of 
this Comment analyzes the three tactics of preemption, equal 
protection, and judicial awareness for challenging anti-immigrant 
employment laws. 
I 
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW IN THE EMPLOYMENT 
CONTEXT 
The two main federal statutes that regulate immigration in the 
employment context are the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (IRCA)9 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).10 Under IRCA, “[i]t is unlawful 
for a person or other entity to hire . . . for employment in the United 
States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien . . . with 
respect to such employment.”11 An “unauthorized alien” is an alien 
who is not “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” or who is not 
“authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney 
General.”12 Before hiring an employee, IRCA requires the employer 
to review certain documents that establish a new hire’s eligibility for 
employment.13 If employers violate IRCA, they may be subject to 
	
7 Julia Preston, Class-Action Lawsuit Says Utah Immigration Law Violates Civil Rights, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/us/04immigration.html. 
8 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).  
9 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
10 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 
3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
11 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
12 Id. § 1324a(h)(3). 
13 Id. § 1324a(b). 
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both civil and criminal sanctions.14 Civil penalties include cease and 
desist orders, financial penalties, and other remedial measures.15 
Criminal penalties include fines and jail time of up to six months.16 
IRCA also imposes fines and other sanctions on employers who 
engage in “unfair immigration-related employment practice[s],” such 
as discrimination based on citizenship or national origin.17 IRCA’s 
preemption clause states the following: “The provisions of this 
section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal 
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those 
who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, 
unauthorized aliens.”18 Thus, state and local laws that impose a civil 
or criminal sanction on employers are preempted unless they are 
licensing or similar laws.19 Under IIRIRA, Congress established three 
programs to improve the process for verification of worker eligibility 
for employers.20 E-Verify, originally called the Basic Pilot Program, 
is the only program that is still currently in operation.21 
A. E-Verify–the Federal System for Verification of Work-
Authorization Status 
E-Verify “is an internet-based system that allows an employer to 
verify an employee’s work-authorization status.”22 As of mid-March 
2012, more than 345,400 employers were enrolled in E-Verify.23 This 
number represented about six percent of U.S. employers, but this 
percentage will continue to increase with an average of 2,000 new 
employers enrolling each week.24 
	
14 Id. § 1324a(e)–(f). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. § 1324a(f)(1). 
17 Id. § 1324b(a)(1), (g)(2)(B). 
18 Id. § 1324a(h)(2). 
19 Id.  
20 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 401, 110 
Stat. 3009, 3009-655 to -56 (1996); Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. 
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975 (2011). 
21 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 § 401; Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 
1975. 
22 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1975 (quoting Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 
F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 2009)); U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., I AM AN 
EMPLOYER . . . HOW DO I . . . USE E-VERIFY? (2008), available at www.uscis.gov/USCIS 
/Resources/E4en.pdf. 
23 ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40446, ELECTRONIC EMPLOYMENT 
ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION 3 (2012). 
24 Id. 
SITTON (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2013  8:49 AM 
2013] Challenging State and Local Anti-Immigrant Employment Laws 965 
Employers that use E-Verify must verify the status of all new 
hires–citizens and noncitizens alike.25 E-Verify compares the 
information an employee provides on the Employment Eligibility 
Verification I-9 Form against government records, including Social 
Security Administration records, Department of State passport 
records, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) databases.26 
To begin the employment verification process, the employer submits 
a request to the E-Verify system based on information that the worker 
provides on the I-9 Form.27 Next, the employer will receive one of 
four notices: employment authorized notice, DHS verification in 
process notice, tentative nonconfirmation notice, or final 
nonconfirmation notice.28 An employment authorized notice means 
the worker is authorized for employment.29 A DHS verification in 
process notice means, “a manual review of the records in government 
databases is necessary.”30 A tentative nonconfirmation notice: 
	
25 E-Verify: Preserving Jobs for American Workers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 26–
27 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement 
Hearing] (written testimony of Theresa C. Bertucci, Associate Director, Enterprise 
Services Directorate, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) (stating that federal 
contractors with a Federal Acquisition Regulation E-Verify clause in their contract may 
elect to verify new hires and existing employees or may choose to verify their entire 
workforce); U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 22, at 2. 
26 2011 House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement Hearing, supra 
note 25, at 26; What is E-Verify? Instant Verification of Work Authorization, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site 
/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=a7469589cdb76210V
gnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=a7469589cdb76210VgnVCM100000b92
ca60aRCRD; see also BRUNO, supra note 23, at 2 (stating that employers must submit the 
following information from the new hires’ I-9 forms: “name, date of birth, Social Security 
number, immigration/citizenship status, and alien number, if applicable”). 
27 E-Verify for Employers: The Verification Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. 
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a75 
43f6d1a/?vgnextoid=d4abfb41c8596210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel
=d4abfb41c8596210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD (last updated May 7, 2012). 
28 Id.; E-Verify for Employees: E-Verify Overview, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. 
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a75 
43f6d1a/?vgnextoid=7f19fb41c8596210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel
=7f19fb41c8596210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD (last updated Sept. 14, 2012). 
29 Id.; E-Verify for Employers: The Verification Process, supra note 27. 
30 E-Verify for Employers: The Verification Process, supra note 27; E-Verify for 
Employers: Tentative Nonconfirmations, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES (Oct. 
4, 2010), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a75 
43f6d1a/?vgnextoid=8fdbfb41c8596210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel
=8fdbfb41c8596210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD. 
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[M]eans that the Social Security Administration (SSA) and/or the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) could not confirm 
that the employee’s information matches government records. It 
does not mean an employee is unauthorized to work or is an illegal 
immigrant as there are legitimate reasons why an employee may 
receive this result.31 
Employees may challenge a tentative nonconfirmation notice,32 and 
they have eight federal workdays to do so.33 If a worker contests the 
notice, the employer cannot take adverse action against a worker, 
such as reducing work hours, delaying training, or terminating 
employment.34 If an employee chooses not to challenge a 
nonconfirmation notice or that challenge is unsuccessful, then it 
becomes a final nonconfirmation.35 A final nonconfirmation means 
the employee must be terminated or, if the employer continues to 
employ the new hire, DHS must be informed.36 If an employer 
continues to employ the worker who received a final 
nonconfirmation, it “is subject to a rebuttable presumption that it 
knowingly employed an unauthorized alien.”37 
B. Requiring the Use of E-Verify 
Currently, under federal law, only certain federal government 
employers are required to use E-Verify to verify employee work-
authorization status.38 In fact, IIRIRA prohibits the Secretary of 
Homeland Security from requiring “any person or other entity” 
	
31 E-Verify for Employers: Tentative Nonconfirmations, supra note 30. 
32 E-Verify for Employees: Resolving a Tentative Nonconfirmation, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
AND IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5 
b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=017bfb41c8596210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCR
D&vgnextchannel=017bfb41c8596210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD (last updated 
Sept. 14, 2012). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975 
(2011); E-Verify for Employees, E-Verify Overview, supra note 28. 
37 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 
403(a)(4)(C)(iii), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-662 (1996); Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1975; Chicanos 
Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 2009). 
38 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 § 403(a), (e); What is E-Verify?, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menu 
item.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=e94888e60a405110VgnVCM100
0004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=e94888e60a405110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCR
D (last updated Nov. 1, 2012) (“E-Verify is also mandatory for employers with federal 
contracts or subcontracts that contain the Federal Acquisition Regulation E-Verify 
clause.”). 
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outside of the federal government to use E-Verify.39 However, to 
encourage use of the program outside of the federal government, 
IIRIRA states that any employer that uses E-Verify “and obtains 
confirmation of identity and employment eligibility in compliance 
with the terms and conditions of the program . . . has established a 
rebuttable presumption that” it has not violated IRCA’s prohibition 
against employing unauthorized aliens.40 Even though the federal 
government cannot require nonfederal employers to use E-Verify, 
several states have passed laws requiring nonfederal employers to use 
E-Verify.41 
II 
STATE AND LOCAL ANTI-IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION 
In the past few years, there have been many cases involving state 
and local laws regulating the area of employment and immigration. 
The cases discussed below are just two examples of the types of 
challenges that are likely to succeed or fail in this area of law. The 
cases also demonstrate the complexity of the immigration laws in the 
United States. 
A. Challenges to State Legislation 
Recently, decisions have been made in several cases challenging 
state legislation involving employment and immigration.42 Chamber 
	
39 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 § 402(a); Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 
1975. 
40 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 § 402(b)(1); Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1975. 
41 Morse, supra note 3. 
42 See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1290 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that certain parts of Alabama House Bill 56 were preempted in a lawsuit brought by the 
United States Department of Justice. Specifically, the court held that denying an employer 
a tax deduction when it employed unauthorized immigrants was a sanction under the 
meaning of IRCA, and thus, the state was preempted from imposing it.); Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 750 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(affirming on preemption grounds a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of certain 
provisions of an Oklahoma law that required all employers to verify work-authorization 
status of new hires; holding the requirement that public agencies and state contractors 
verify work-authorization status was not preempted); Utah Coal. of La Raza v. Herbert, 
No. 2:11-CV-401 CW, 2011 WL 7143098 (D. Utah May 11, 2011) (the ACLU and the 
National Immigration Law Center have filed a class-action lawsuit challenging Utah 
House Bill 497 (Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act) on preemption and other grounds); 
see also Lizette Alvarez, Florida Struggles with Arizona’s Immigration Plan, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/us/05florida.html (citing the fact that a 
provision requiring the use of E-Verify was voted out of the Florida state immigration 
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of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting is the most recent 
Supreme Court decision regarding preemption of immigration laws in 
the employment context.43 To fully grasp the success of preemption 
challenges in the immigration employment context this case must be 
discussed. Whiting involved a preemption challenge by the Chamber 
of Commerce of the United States to the Legal Arizona Workers Act 
(the Act).44 The Act allows and, in certain circumstances, requires the 
licenses of employers to be suspended or revoked if they knowingly 
or intentionally employ an unauthorized worker.45 The Act provides a 
certain procedure for determining an employee’s work-authorization 
status after a complaint has been filed alleging an employer has hired 
an unauthorized worker.46 To verify an employee’s work-
authorization status, “the attorney general or county attorney shall 
verify the work authorization of the alleged unauthorized alien with 
the federal government pursuant to 8 United States Code § 
1373(c).”47 This section states the following: 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an 
inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to 
verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any 
individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose 
authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status 
information.48 
The Act prohibits state, county, or local officials from attempting “to 
independently make a final determination on whether an alien is 
authorized to work in the United States”49 as is prohibited by 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1373(c). If verification of the employee’s work authorization status 
shows the employee is an unauthorized worker, then the attorney 
general or county attorney must notify United States Customs and 
	
law); Judge Blocks Key Parts of Georgia Immigration Law, CNN (June 27, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-27/us/georgia.immigration.lawsuit_1_judge-blocks-key     
-parts-illegal-immigration-immigration-status?_s=PM:US; Jeremy Redmon, Georgia’s 
New Immigration Law Requirements Confuse Businesses, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 3, 
2011, 2:58 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/georgias-new            
-immigration-law-1157121.html (citing that in Georgia, parts of a law requiring the use of 
E-Verify were criticized because the E-Verify procedures confuse employers). 
43 See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968. 
44 See id. 
45 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to 23-212.01 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d 
Reg. Sess.); Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1976. 
46 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(B). 
47 Id. 
48 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2006). 
49 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(B). 
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Immigration Services (USCIS) officials, notify local law 
enforcement, and bring an action against the employer.50 The Act also 
requires that all Arizona employers use E-Verify to confirm the 
employees are legally authorized to work.51 Verification of a 
worker’s authorization for employment through E-Verify “creates a 
rebuttable presumption that an employer did not knowingly employ 
an unauthorized alien.”52 
In Whiting, the Court focused on whether the Act was expressly or 
impliedly preempted by federal immigration laws.53 The Court held 
that the provisions of the Act were neither expressly nor impliedly 
preempted.54 When the Court looked at whether the law was 
expressly preempted, the Court asked whether the federal law at issue 
had a preemption clause.55 When the federal law contains an express 
preemption clause, the Court will “‘focus on the plain wording of the 
clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ 
preemptive intent.’”56 The federal law at issue, IRCA, contains an 
express preemption clause, which states, “[t]he provisions of this 
section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal 
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those 
who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, 
unauthorized aliens.”57 The Court looked at the text of the Act and 
concluded that, on its face, the Act “purports to impose sanctions 
through licensing laws.”58 Licensing laws are one area that the IRCA 
preemption clause leaves open for states to regulate employment of 
immigrants.59 Thus, the Court said the Act “falls well within the 
confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the States and 
therefore is not expressly preempted.”60 
The Chamber of Commerce made several arguments in favor of 
preemption. First, it argued the Act was impliedly preempted because 
it conflicts with federal law as Congress intended the federal system 
	
50 Id. § 23-212(C)(1)–(3), (D). 
51 Id. § 23-214(A). 
52 Id. § 23-212(I). 
53 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974 
(2011). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1977. 
56 Id. at 1977 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). 
57 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006). 
58 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977–78. 
59 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). 
60 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981. 
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to be exclusive.61 The Court held the Act was not impliedly 
preempted because Congress expressly allowed states to implement 
sanctions through licensing laws, which is what the Arizona law 
does.62 The Court also pointed to the fact that “Arizona went the extra 
mile” to ensure its law followed the federal laws (IRCA and IIRIRA) 
in “all material respects.”63 For example, the Arizona Act adopts the 
federal definition of “unauthorized alien,” as defined in 8 U.S.C. 
§1324a(h)(3).64 In addition, the Act tries to ensure that only the 
federal government determines the work-authorization status of an 
employee.65 Specifically, the Act says state investigators must verify 
the work authorization of an allegedly unauthorized alien with the 
federal government and “shall not attempt to independently make a 
final determination on whether an alien is authorized to work in the 
United States.”66 Additionally, a state court must consider only the 
federal government’s determination when deciding if an employee is 
an unauthorized worker.67 Other similarities exist between the Act 
and federal laws. For instance, both prohibit “knowingly” employing 
an unauthorized alien,68 both provide the same affirmative defense of 
good-faith compliance with the I-9 process,69 and both give 
employers a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the law when 
they use E-Verify to validate a finding of employment eligibility.70 
Second, the Chamber of Commerce argued the Act is impliedly 
preempted because it “upsets the balance that Congress sought to 
strike when enacting IRCA.”71 The Court said that regulating in-state 
	
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. Compare id., with Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 213 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(showing the similarity between the courts’ reasoning despite the different outcomes. In 
Whiting, the Court noted that the Act mirrored federal law, and upheld it. In Lozano, the 
court noted that the law differed from federal law, and struck it down.), cert. granted, 
vacated sub nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). 
64 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981. 
65 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(B), (H) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. 
Sess.). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1982. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2006), with ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(A). 
69 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1982. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 23-212(J). 
70 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1982-83. Compare Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act 
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 402(b), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-656 to -657 (1996), with 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(I). 
71 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1983. 
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businesses through licensing has never been an area of dominant 
federal concern, and states can regulate in this area.72 Thus, the 
federal program in this case “operates unimpeded by the state law.”73 
Third, the Chamber of Commerce argued that employers would 
tend to discriminate rather than risk license termination and sanctions 
by hiring unauthorized immigrants.74 In response, the Court reasoned 
that license termination is a severe consequence, so only “egregious 
violations of the law trigger that consequence.”75 The Court stated 
that the Act does not displace the IRCA antidiscrimination provisions 
and Arizona antidiscrimination laws that protect employees from 
discrimination.76 The Court also stated that the “high threshold [for a] 
state law . . . to be preempted for conflicting with the purposes of a 
federal Act” was not met here.77 
Lastly, the Chamber of Commerce argued that the Arizona Act 
provision mandating use of E-Verify was impliedly preempted 
because it impeded Congress’s purpose.78 The Court said states could 
require use of E-Verify because IIRIRA only constrains the federal 
government from mandating the use of E-Verify.79 Thus, the Court 
found federal law neither expressly nor impliedly preempted the 
Arizona Legal Workers Act.80 
B. Challenges to Local Ordinances 
There have been several recent cases challenging local ordinances 
on preemption grounds.81 However, Lozano v. City of Hazleton offers 
	
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 1984. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1985 (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 110 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 
(1982) (this high threshold was described as: “whether there exists an irreconcilable 
conflict between the federal and state regulatory scheme. The existence of a hypothetical 
or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-emption of the state statute.”). 
78 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1974. 
81 See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010) (“As we noted at 
the outset, state and local attempts to regulate issues related to immigration have 
skyrocketed in recent years.”), cert. granted, vacated sub nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. 
Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 
701 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (striking down a local ordinance dealing with 
regulation of rental housing for immigrants on preemption grounds); Gray v. City of 
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the best example because the Supreme Court vacated the judgment 
and remanded the case to the Third Circuit for consideration in light 
of the decision in Whiting.82 In Lozano, the Third Circuit upheld the 
district court’s decision to enjoin the enforcement of two local 
ordinances in Pennsylvania that were passed to regulate employment 
and housing of certain immigrants.83 One of the ordinances titled the 
Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (IIRAO) deals with 
employment of unlawful immigrants.84 The ordinance states that it is 
illegal for a business to employ an “unlawful worker.”85 An 
“‘unlawful worker’ means a person who does not have the legal right 
or authorization to work due to an impediment in any provision of 
federal, state or local law, including but not limited to . . . an 
unauthorized alien as defined by [8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3)].”86 The 
ordinance requires every business that applies for a business permit to 
“sign an affidavit . . . affirming that they do not knowingly utilize the 
services or hire any person who is an unlawful worker.”87 Any 
Hazleton resident may submit a complaint to the Code Enforcement 
Office.88 Once a complaint is received, the Code Enforcement Office 
sends a request to the business for identity information about the 
alleged unlawful worker.89 The business must provide the information 
within three business days or its license will be suspended.90 If the 
worker is an alleged unlawful immigrant, “the Code Enforcement 
	
Valley Park, No. 4:07CV00881, 2008 WL 294294 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (upholding a 
local employment ordinance against preemption, Due Process Clause, and Equal 
Protection Clause challenges), aff’d on other grounds, 567 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2009); 
Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (striking down local 
ordinances barring landlords from renting to undocumented persons among other 
proscriptions based on preemption grounds); Ann Morse et al., Immigrant Policy Project: 
2009 State Laws Related to Immigrants and Immigration January 1–December 31, 2009, 
NAT’L CONF. ON ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research 
/immig/2009-state-immigration-laws.aspx; Joy Segreto, supra note 2. 
82 Lozano, 620 F.3d at 176. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 177. The second ordinance titled the Rental Registration Ordinance deals with 
the housing of unlawful immigrants and will not be discussed in detail here because it does 
not touch upon employment of unlawful immigrants. 
85 Id. at 177–78. 
86 Id. at 178 (quoting HAZELTON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-18, § 3(E), available at 
http://www.aclupa.org/issues/immigrantsrights/hazleton/hazletonordinances.htm 
[hereinafter HAZELTON ORDINANCE]). 
87 Id. (quoting HAZELTON ORDINANCE, supra note 86, § 4(A)). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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Office submits any identity information received from the business to 
the federal government, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373, for verification 
of ‘the immigration status of such person(s).’”91 If the federal 
government confirms the worker is not authorized to work in the 
United States, the business must terminate the worker’s employment 
within three business days or its license will be suspended.92 The 
ordinance provides safe harbor from this sanction if the business 
verifies the work-authorization status of its workers through E-
Verify.93 
Pedro Lozano, other Hazleton residents, and the Hazleton Hispanic 
Business Association facially challenged the ordinances on several 
grounds, including the Supremacy Clause (preemption), the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the limits of 
Hazleton’s police powers.94 The Third Circuit struck down both local 
ordinances based on Supremacy Clause (preemption) grounds.95 The 
court said the employment ordinance was a licensing law, and 
therefore, was not expressly preempted by IRCA, which provides that 
licensing or similar laws are not preempted.96 However, the court 
struck down the ordinance because of implied conflict preemption,97 
noting several differences between the local ordinance and IRCA.98 
First, the court said one purpose of IRCA was to reduce the burden 
on the employer, and the local ordinance “significantly increases 
employer burden by creating a separate and independent adjudicative 
system for determining whether an employer is guilty of employing 
unauthorized aliens.”99 For example, under the local ordinance, 
Hazleton’s Code Enforcement Office must investigate every 
complaint, while IRCA requires that complaints with a “substantial 
probability of validity” be investigated.100 The local ordinance also 
provides fewer procedural protections for employers than IRCA.101 
Under IRCA, certain protections are given to employers before 
	
91 Id. (quoting HAZELTON ORDINANCE, supra note 86, § 4(B)(3)). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 181. 
95 Id. at 210. 
96 Id. at 208–09. 
97 Id. at 210; see infra Part IV.A for description of implied conflict preemption. 
98 Lozano, 620 F.3d at 212–13. 
99 Id at 212. 
100 Id. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(1) (2006), with HAZELTON ORDINANCE, supra 
note 86, § 4(B)(2)–(3). 
101 Lozano, 620 F.3d at 212. 
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sanctions can be imposed.102 For example, an employer must be 
given notice and a hearing opportunity, and an administrative law 
judge must find a violation of IRCA before an employer is 
sanctioned.103 Under the local ordinance, none of the same 
protections exist.104 An employer’s license will be suspended 
immediately if it fails to provide information about alleged unlawful 
workers or if it fails to terminate a worker who is found to be 
unlawful within three business days.105 
Second, the Lozano court also looked at the differences in the 
antidiscrimination provisions and sanctions. IRCA imposes equal 
sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized workers and who 
discriminate, but the local ordinance does not impose equal 
sanctions.106 In fact, the local ordinance imposes more sanctions on 
employers who hire unauthorized workers.107 The Lozano court stated 
the following: “This creates the exact situation that Congress feared: a 
system under which employers might quite rationally choose to err on 
the side of discriminating against job applicants they perceive to be 
foreign. This is inconsistent with IRCA and therefore cannot be 
tolerated under the Supremacy Clause.”108 While the Lozano court 
found several differences between the local ordinance and IRCA, it 
ultimately said the following: 
The crux of this conflict, however, transcends the differences 
between the IIRAO’s prosecution and adjudication system and 
IRCA’s. Rather, it is rooted in the fact that Hazleton has established 
an alternate system at all . . . . Congress created a comprehensive 
and carefully balanced prosecution and adjudication system, and 
foremost among its goals in doing so was to minimize the burden 
this system would impose on employers. We therefore cannot 
fathom that Congress intended to tolerate the “supplementing” of its 
carefully crafted system with independent state and local systems, 
which by their mere existence drastically increase burdens on 
employers.109 
While the Supreme Court ultimately vacated and remanded the 
case back to the Third Circuit, it is not clear that the decision will be 
	
102 Id. at 212–13; 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e). 
103 Lozano, 620 F.3d at 212–13 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)). 
104 Lozano, 620 F.3d at 213. 
105 Id.; HAZELTON ORDINANCE, supra note 86, § 4(B)(3)–(4). 
106 Lozano, 620 F.3d at 217–18. 
107 Id. at 218. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 213 (citation omitted). 
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overturned. This is because the Third Circuit’s decision rested on the 
fact that the City of Hazleton passed ordinances that strayed from the 
federal system. The decision in Whiting emphasized the fact that 
Arizona passed an Act that aligned with the federal system.110 Thus, 
the Third Circuit used reasoning similar to that of the Court in 
Whiting. 
III 
EFFECTS OF RECENT CHALLENGES TO ANTI-IMMIGRANT 
EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Whiting and the other recent 
legislation has affected the area of immigration and employment in 
several ways. These effects include the use of E-Verify, the concerns 
about discrimination, and the possibility of strain on law enforcement 
agencies. 
A. Impact of Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting 
The Court’s decision in Whiting has had at least three major 
outcomes. These impacts include (1) the mandatory use of E-Verify, 
(2) the discriminatory actions of employers, and (3) the effect on 
other preemption challenges. Each of these impacts and its current 
and future implications will be discussed in this Section. 
1. The Mandatory Use of E-Verify 
One result of the Court’s decision in Whiting is that states may 
require employers to use E-Verify.111 The Arizona Act, at issue in 
Whiting, requires that “every employer, after hiring an employee, 
shall verify the employment eligibility of the employee” using E-
Verify.112 If states can require employers to use E-Verify to verify 
new hires’ authorization status, this increased use will place more 
strain on an already flawed system of verification. 
Since the implementation of E-Verify, several studies have been 
conducted on the strengths and weaknesses of the system. One study 
	
110 See supra Part II.A. 
111 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974 
(2011); E-Verify for Employers: Tentative Nonconfirmations, supra note 30 (E-Verify is 
an internet-based system that compares the information an employee provides on the I-9 
Form to various government databases to determine the employee’s work-authorization 
status). 
112 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214(A) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.). 
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conducted by the Migration Policy Institute Task Force, chaired by 
former Senator Spencer Abraham and former Representative Lee 
Hamilton, showed E-Verify has significant problems.113 For example, 
some of “[t]he problems that need to be corrected include delayed 
entry of data reflecting admission or status changes, data entry errors, 
the ability of individuals to view and correct their records, and 
alternate spellings or word order of foreign names.”114 These 
problems can lead to incorrect work-authorization status 
determinations, especially if a worker’s data has not been updated. In 
addition, E-Verify “generates an unacceptably high level of secondary 
verification responses. Twenty percent of noncitizens and thirteen 
percent of US [sic] citizens are initially not confirmed and can only be 
confirmed if they contact SSA or USCIS.”115 Since the Migration 
Policy Institute report, E-Verify has been improved in certain areas. 
One such area is that the system accuracy has increased and the 
tentative nonconfirmation rate has decreased.116 
While some improvements have been made, other problems still 
exist. For example, in a three-month period in 2008, about 3.4 percent 
of E-Verify’s work-authorization confirmations were found to be 
mistakes due to fraudulent identity data.117 This points to a larger 
issue with the E-Verify system. E-Verify cannot detect identity or 
document fraud because while “the system usually can confirm 
whether or not a name and social security or alien identification 
number exist in a federal database, the system cannot confirm 
whether a name and identifying number actually belong to the worker 
being hired.”118 While USCIS has implemented a photo-matching 
tool to help prevent the use of false identities, this tool only allows 
	
113 DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION AND 
AMERICA’S FUTURE 48–49 (2006), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 49 (“Ninety percent of these tentatively non-confirmed applicants fail to 
pursue their cases because employers mishandle their applications, workers find it easier to 
change employment than to correct their records, or they do not have legal status and are 
not authorized to work.”). 
116 Marc R. Rosenblum, E-Verify: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Proposals for Reform, 
INSIGHT (Migration Policy Inst., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2011, at 6–7, available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/E-Verify-Insight.pdf.  
117 Id. at 6 (citing WESTAT CORP., FINDINGS OF THE E-VERIFY PROGRAM EVALUATION 
50, 115 (2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/Final%20E   
-Verify%20Report%2012-16-09_2.pdf). 
118 ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42434, IMMIGRATION OF 
TEMPORARY LOWER-SKILLED WORKERS: CURRENT POLICY AND RELATED ISSUES 17 
(2012); Rosenblum, supra note 116, at 5. 
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employers to compare DHS-issued documents and U.S. passports.119 
This search limitation will not completely prevent fraud when 
employees use a driver’s license to establish their identity.120 This 
inability to detect fraud is compounded by employers’ actions. First, 
when employers tell workers to provide documents that do not trigger 
the photo-screening tool, which has occurred in Arizona, fraud goes 
undetected. Second, when employers do not use E-Verify to check the 
status of all their new hires even when required to do so by law, 
which is likely to have occurred in Arizona, they allow fraud to 
continue.121 
Another issue with E-Verify is that employers tend to misuse the 
system. When an employee has a tentative nonconfirmation, 
employers must follow certain requirements. However, some 
employers have not followed these requirements. Instead, they have 
not informed employees or applicants of their status or have taken 
adverse employment action against them.122 Even though employer 
misuse of E-Verify is a problem, there does not seem to be a viable 
solution. This is because USCIS has only limited authority to 
investigate employer misuse.123 Additionally, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, the agency that investigates, sanctions, and 
prosecutes employers, “has limited resources to investigate and 
sanction employers that knowingly hire unauthorized workers or 
	
119 Document Fraud in Employment Authorization: How an E-Verify Requirement Can 
Help: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2012) (statements of Lamar Smith, Chairman of 
the H. Judiciary Comm., U.S. Rep.) [hereinafter 2012 House Subcommittee on 
Immigration Policy and Enforcement Hearing]; E-Verify for Employers: Photo Matching, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menu 
item.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=bbcbfb41c8596210VgnVCM1000
00b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=bbcbfb41c8596210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD 
(last updated Oct. 4, 2010). 
120 E-Verify for Employers: Photo Matching, supra note 119; see also Rosenblum, 
supra note 116, at 9–11 (noting that although USCIS has created a Monitoring and 
Compliance Branch, it is limited in its ability to detect fraud and enforce violations.). 
121 Rosenblum, supra note 116, at 6; WESTAT, supra note 117, at 87. 
122 WESTAT, supra note 117, at 235; see also Rosenblum, supra note 116, at 7–8. 
123 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-330T, EMPLOYMENT 
VERIFICATION: FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE E-VERIFY, BUT 
SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES REMAIN 30–32 (2011); see also 2011 House Subcommittee on 
Immigration Policy and Enforcement Hearing, supra note 25, at 38 (statement of Richard 
M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, United States Government 
Accountability Office). 
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those that knowingly violate E-Verify program rules.”124 Recognizing 
these problems, Congress has continually made E-Verify a voluntary 
program for most employers.125 However, there are currently several 
bills in Congress that contain provisions to make E-Verify a 
mandatory program126 or propose a program to replace E-Verify.127 
2. The Discriminatory Actions of Employers 
A second impact of the Whiting decision is the increased potential 
for discrimination by employers. The Arizona Act at issue in Whiting 
gives employers protection from sanctions if they use the E-Verify 
system: “proof of verifying the employment authorization of an 
employee through the e-verify program [sic] creates a rebuttable 
presumption that an employer did not knowingly employ an 
unauthorized alien.”128 Thus, in Arizona, state law incentivizes 
employers to use E-Verify by offering some protection from 
sanctions. 
With the possibility of avoiding sanctions, an employer may 
choose to use E-Verify and still discriminate. For example, if the 
employer receives a tentative nonconfirmation or has to wait for a 
new hire to be authorized, it may choose instead not to hire that 
person because it believes the person is not authorized. This may be 
due to the fact that a new hire appears foreign or speaks with an 
accent. An employer may also discriminate because of the harsher 
penalties it would face under the Arizona law. For example, if 
employers suspect a new hire may be unauthorized, they may 
discriminate against that person and not hire them in order to avoid 
	
124 2011 House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement Hearing, supra 
note 25, at 45 (prepared statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and 
Justice Issues, United States Government Accountability Office). 
125 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 403(a), 
(e), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-659 (1996); Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. 
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975 (2011); What is E-Verify?, supra note 38. 
126 See Accountability Through Electronic Verification Act, S. 1196, 112th Cong. (June 
14, 2011); Jobs Recovery by Ensuring a Legal American Workforce Act of 2011, H.R. 
800, 112th Cong. (Feb. 11, 2011); see also ANDORRA BRUNO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42036, IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND ISSUES IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 7–9 
(2012). 
127 See Legal Workforce Act, H.R. 2885, 112th Cong. (Sept. 12, 2011); Electronic 
Employment Eligibility Verification and Illegal Immigration Control Act, H.R. 483, 112th 
Cong. (Jan. 26, 2011); Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection 
Act of 2011, H.R. 98, 112th Cong. (Jan. 5, 2011); see also BRUNO ET AL., supra note 126, 
at 7–9. 
128 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(I) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.); 
see also id. § 23-212(J). 
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the sanctions. Under the Arizona law, if an employer is found to have 
intentionally hired an unauthorized worker, it faces harsher penalties 
than it would under IRCA.129 The dissent in Whiting pointed to the 
possibility of discrimination due to these severe penalties: 
If even the federal [sic] Act (with its carefully balanced penalties) 
can result in some employers discriminating, how will employers 
behave when erring on the side of discrimination leads only to 
relatively small fines, while erring on the side of hiring 
unauthorized workers leads to the “business death penalty” [under 
state law]?130 
Another report by Westat concluded that “E-Verify contributes to 
post-hiring discrimination against foreign-born workers, since 
foreign-born workers with employment authorization are more likely 
to incorrectly receive TNCs [tentative nonconfirmations].”131 A 
USCIS Report to Congress also found that problems with the E-
Verify system contributed to unintentional discrimination against 
foreign-born persons.132 
The antidiscrimination provision was included in IRCA precisely 
because House members feared that imposition of sanctions on 
employers would cause discrimination. The House Committee on 
Education and Labor stated the following: 
The Committee on Education and Labor strongly endorses this 
provision and the [sic] has consistently expressed its fear that the 
imposition of employer sanctions will give rise to employment 
discrimination against Hispanic Americans and other minority 
group members. It is the committee’s view that if there is to be 
sanctions enforcement and liability there must be an equally strong 
and readily available remedy if resulting employment 
discrimination occurs. In the last Congress, the full House of 
Representatives recognized in [sic] potential for this unfortunate 
cause and effect relationship between sanctions enforcement and 
	
129 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (2006), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23–
212.01(F) (stating that under federal statute, an employer is subject to civil penalties 
ranging from $250 to $10,000 while under the Arizona statute, an employer will have its 
licenses revoked for a minimum of ten days). 
130 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1990 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
131 WESTAT, supra note 117, at 235 (“Although the process for resolving TNCs is 
usually neither costly nor burdensome, some workers with employment authorization are 
dismissed or not hired because of TNCs without an opportunity to avail themselves of 
their right to resolve their TNCs with SSA or USCIS.”). 
132 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BASIC 
PILOT PROGRAM 3 (2004), (“[T]he tentative nonconfirmation rate was unacceptably high 
for foreign-born work-authorized employees and was higher than desirable for U.S.-born 
employees. This created burdens for employees and employers . . . and led to unintentional 
discrimination against foreign-born persons.”). 
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resulting employment discrimination and by an overwhelming vote 
of 404–9, adopted the so-called “Frank Anti-discrimination” 
amendment.133 
Some of the House testimony about the possibility of discrimination 
came from former Senator Gary Hart who said, “The employer 
sanctions in the legislation will undoubtedly act as an incentive for 
businesses to ‘play it safe’ and refuse to hire individuals whose status 
may be in question. This would mean that [B]lacks, Hispanics, and 
Asians would encounter new difficulties in getting hired.”134 
Congress’s fear of discrimination was not unfounded. A 1990 U.S. 
Government Accountability Office Report found widespread 
discrimination as a result of IRCA.135 
In Whiting, the Chamber of Commerce made several arguments 
about the discriminatory effects of the law.136 The majority rejected 
these arguments, citing in part the protections provided by Title VII 
and Arizona law.137 However, under IRCA, an employee cannot seek 
the protection of both IRCA’s antidiscrimination clause and Title 
VII.138 Additionally, while IRCA does offer some protection against 
alienage discrimination,139 meaning discrimination based on a 
person’s citizenship status, Title VII does not.140 
The Court also failed to recognize that workers do not always 
recover under these protections.141 One reason it is difficult to recover 
is that only certain people are able to recover under IRCA—citizens, 
	
133 H.R. REP. NO. 99–682(II), at 12 (1986). 
134 132 CONG. REC. S16879–01 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hart). 
135 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, T-GGD-90-31, IMMIGRATION REFORM: 
EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION (1990). 
136 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1984 
(2011). 
137 Id. (“Other federal laws, and Arizona anti-discrimination laws, provide further 
protection against employment discrimination—and strong incentive for employers not to 
discriminate.”); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on 
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41–1463(B)(1) 
(West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.). 
138 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(B), (b)(2). 
139 Id. § 1324b(a)(1)(B). 
140 See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). 
141 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002) (stating that 
a plaintiff who is not work authorized may face severely limited remedies). But see 
Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 478 F.3d 1160, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
lawful permanent resident plaintiff was unable to recover under a Title VII claim of 
national origin discrimination); Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 
2004) (calling into doubt whether Hoffman applies because of policy against 
discrimination). 
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certain lawful permanent residents, newly legalized immigrants, 
refugees, and asylees.142 However, certain lawful permanent 
residents, nonimmigrants (even if they are authorized to work), and 
parolees are not protected under IRCA.143 Another reason it is 
difficult to recover is that IRCA requires discriminatory intent on the 
part of the employer if it asks for more or different documents than 
required by statute.144 United States citizens may not be able to 
recover on the basis of citizenship discrimination under certain 
statutes.145 This is a problem when the employer or E-Verify 
incorrectly identifies a United States citizen as an unauthorized 
employee who is then fired because of the mistake. Thus, even though 
statutes offer some protection against discrimination, they may not 
offer enough protection to workers. This is especially true if 
employers choose to err on the side of discriminating instead of 
facing the harsh sanctions under Arizona law. 
3. The Effect on Other Preemption Challenges 
A third implication of the Court’s decision in Whiting is its effect 
on other recent decisions involving preemption challenges. An 
example of the most direct effect is the Supreme Court’s decision to 
vacate the judgment in Lozano v. City of Hazleton and remand the 
case back to the Third Circuit for further consideration in light of the 
Whiting decision.146 The effect of the Whiting decision on this case is 
unclear but is discussed further in Part IV.A. 
B. Impact of Recent Legislation 
Recently, many states and municipalities have passed laws and 
ordinances affecting immigrants.147 While many of these laws do not 
	
142 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. § 1324b(a)(6). 
145 Espinoza, 414 U.S. 86; Jatoi v. Hurst–Euless–Bedford Hosp. Auth., 807 F.2d 1214, 
1219 (5th Cir. 1987) (dismissing § 1981 claim because plaintiff was a U.S. citizen), 
modified, 819 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1987); Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, Ltd., 
798 F.2d 731, 735 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating in regard to the plaintiff’s § 1981 claim, “but (in 
America) discrimination against Americans can never be discrimination based on 
alienage”). 
146 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 201–02 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
vacated sub nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). 
147 Id. (“As we noted at the outset, state and local attempts to regulate issues related to 
immigration have skyrocketed in recent years.”); Ann Morse et al., Immigrant Policy 
Project: 2009 State Laws Related to Immigrants and Immigration January 1–December 
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involve employment, they still provide insight into the ill effects of 
strict enforcement of immigration laws. This anti-immigrant 
legislation has had varying impacts on employers, immigrants, and 
local law enforcement. 
One example of the effect recent legislation has had on employers 
can be found in Prince William County, Virginia.148 In Virginia, 
county supervisors passed measures allowing police officers to check 
the immigration status of anyone who breaks the law.149 The 
measures also stop undocumented immigrants from accessing 
services that help those who are homeless, elderly, or addicted to 
drugs.150 Many immigrants have left Prince William County to avoid 
racial profiling caused by these measures.151 With the rapid departure 
of so many inhabitants, local businesses were adversely affected.152 
Another example of the adverse impact of recent legislation can be 
seen with Florida’s debate over immigration legislation. The Florida 
bill originally contained a provision mandating all employers to use 
E-Verify.153 However, that provision was struck down amidst protests 
by opponents of the provision, including “the Florida Chamber of 
Commerce, Disney, the agricultural industry and law enforcement 
groups, as well as immigrant advocates.”154 The provision’s possible 
impact on agriculture and tourism industries brought up talk of 
boycotts by Latino and African-American civil rights leaders.155 
	
31, 2009, NAT’L CONF. ON ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.ncsl.org/issues  
-research/immig/2009-state-immigration-laws.aspx; Segreto, supra note 2. 
148 Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and 
Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 27–28 (2009). 
149 Nick Miroff & Kristen Mack, After Vote, Pr. William Immigrant Plan Faces 
Hurdles, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content 
/article/2007/10/17/AR2007101700234.html. 
150 Id. 
151 Nick Miroff, A Hispanic Population in Decline, WASH. POST, July 10, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/09/AR2008070902173 
.html; Johnson, supra note 148, at 27–28. 
152 Johnson, supra note 148, at 27; Miroff & Mack, supra note 149. 
153 Alvarez, supra note 42. But see Exec. Order No. 11-116, available at 
http://www.flgov.com/2011-executive-orders/ (requiring that all state agencies and state 
contractors use E-Verify to check the work-authorization status of new hires). 
154 Alvarez, supra note 42. 
155 Preston, supra note 7 (“‘Make no mistake about that: it will bring a loss of revenues, 
and it will do nothing to solve the immigration problem,’ said Janet Murguía, president of 
the National Council of La Raza. She estimated that a boycott led by the groups in Arizona 
cost that state $490 million in lost tourism and convention business.”). 
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Employers and others have also expressed concern over making E-
Verify a mandatory program for all employers.156 Agricultural 
employers in particular are concerned with how a mandatory system 
would affect their ability to quickly hire workers who are desperately 
needed.157 Employers also cite the cost of implementing E-Verify as a 
concern.158 Others are worried that making E-Verify mandatory 
would not solve the problem of employing unauthorized workers but 
rather would force some employers to pay employees under the 
table.159 This means that employees would lose any protections they 
may have had, tax revenue from workers’ wages would be lost, and 
some jobs would be sent overseas.160 Many of these concerns go hand 
in hand with calls for reform of this country’s immigration laws as a 
whole.161 
While immigrants and employers feel the effects of recent 
legislation, so do state and local law enforcement agencies. For 
example, police officers will have increased duties because many of 
	
156 Rosenblum, supra note 117, at 11–13. 
157 See 2012 House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement Hearing, 
supra note 119 (statement of Bert Lemkes, Co-Owner, Van Wingerden International, Inc.). 
158 2011 House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement Hearing, supra 
note 25, at 139 (statements of Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member, U.S. Rep.) (citing a 
Bloomberg Government analysis stating that it would have cost small businesses $2.6 
billion to implement E-Verify if it had been mandatory and stating that even though E-
Verify is free to use, employers must bear the cost of, among other actions, training 
employees to use it and paying for an internet connection); Dawn Lurie & Kevin Lashus, 
E-Verify is Free–But is it Affordable?, 2011 EMERGING ISSUES 5524, Feb. 22, 2011. 
159 2011 House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement Hearing, supra 
note 25, at 5, 20 (statements of Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member, U.S. Rep. and statements 
of John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Member, U.S. Rep.); Daniel Gonzalez, Illegal Workers 
Manage to Skirt Ariz. Employer-sanctions Law, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Nov. 30, 2008, 12:00 
AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2008/11/30/20081130underground1127 
.html?nclick_check=1. 
160 2011 House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement Hearing, supra 
note 25, at 5, 20 (statements of Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member, U.S. Rep. and statements 
of John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Member, U.S. Rep.). 
161 2012 House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement Hearing, supra 
note 119, at 2–3 (Mandating the use of E-Verify without reforming immigration laws “will 
aggravate the problem [of identity theft] while costing taxpayers billions, harming 
agriculture and other industries. . . . [T]he biggest problem with IRCA was that it cracked 
down on unauthorized employment without ensuring that agriculture and other industries 
had access to authorized labor. Basically it created penalties to address a symptom of a 
broken immigration system, but it did nothing to actually fix the immigration problem 
itself. In doing so, IRCA created a market for false documents and ensured that such a 
market would grow with the Nation’s economy.”). 
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the state and local laws require police to check immigration status.162 
In Arizona’s case, employers are required to report a worker who is 
unauthorized to local law enforcement and to USCIS.163 Also under 
the Arizona Act, county attorneys are authorized to charge employers 
that have employed unauthorized workers.164 These increased duties 
are likely to strain local law enforcement resources, which could lead 
to the misapplication of federal immigration laws by states.165 For 
example, if local officials, who are untrained in immigration laws, are 
required to check immigration status, it is more likely that mistakes 
about a person’s status will be made. It is hard to place full faith in 
these state and local authorities to verify immigration status when 
even courts are unsure of immigration status. For example, one court 
made an incorrect ruling about the immigration status of the plaintiff; 
USCIS later stated the plaintiff was legally in the United States.166 
IV 
TACTICS TO COMBAT ANTI-IMMIGRANT LEGISLATION AFTER 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U.S. V. WHITING 
Challenges to anti-immigrant legislation usually involve 
preemption and equal protection arguments. This Part addresses those 
arguments and their likelihood of success. Lastly, a policy argument 
for increased judicial awareness will also be addressed. 
A. Tactic One: Preemption Challenges 
The first tactic, and most likely to be successful, is a challenge 
based on preemption. The Preemption Doctrine has grown out of the 
	
162 Alvarez, supra note 42; Bill Mears, Parts of Alabama Immigration Law Blocked by 
Federal Appeals Court, CNN (Oct. 14, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/14 
/us/alabama-immigration-law; Miroff & Mack, supra note 149. 
163 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(C)(1)–(3), (D) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d 
Reg. Sess.). 
164 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 2005 
(2011). (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23–212(D), 23–
212.01(D)). 
165 See Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004); Equal 
Access Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655 (E.D. Va. 2004). See generally Nathan G. 
Cortez, The Local Dilemma: Preemption and the Role of Federal Standards in State and 
Local Immigration Laws, 61 SMU L. REV. 47 (2008). 
166 Cortez, supra note 165, at 56–57; see Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 662; Amy 
Argetsinger, Va. Student Unsure of His Standing, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2004, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48785-2004Sep24.html. 
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Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,167 which states, 
“the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing 
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”168 Those who want to challenge immigration laws 
can argue three types of preemption challenges—express preemption, 
implied field preemption, and implied conflict preemption.169 First, 
express preemption means Congress can preempt state law by “so 
stating in express terms.”170 Second, implied field preemption applies 
when language expressly preempting the state law is absent,171 but 
“Congress’ [sic] intent to pre-empt [sic] all state law in a particular 
area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is 
sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress ‘left no room’ for supplementary state regulation.”172 Third, 
implied conflict preemption applies when there is no language that 
expressly preempts state law, but a state law “actually conflicts with 
federal law.”173 This means either that compliance with both state and 
federal law is impossible, or that state law “stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress.”174 No matter the type of preemption challenge, “the 
purpose of Congress” is the “touchstone” of any preemption 
inquiry.175 
Additionally, courts look to whether states have reached beyond 
the scope of their historic police power into an area historically 
regulated by the federal government.176 However, it is unlikely that a 
court will find a state has reached beyond the scope of its historic 
police power by regulating employment. The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that regulation of employment is within a state’s police 
powers. For example, in De Canas v. Bica, the Court said, “[s]tates 
	
167 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 203 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
vacated sub nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). 
168 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
169 Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). 
170 Id. (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). 
171 Id. 
172 Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
175 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 203 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. granted, 
vacated sub nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). 
176 Id. at 203. 
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possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the 
employment relationship to protect workers within the State.”177 
An express preemption challenge to a state law based on the fact 
that it conflicts with IRCA may fail. For a state law to be expressly 
preempted by IRCA, it must not be a licensing or similar law.178 In 
both Lozano and Whiting, the courts found the laws were licensing or 
similar laws, and thus, were not expressly preempted by federal 
law.179 However, a recent decision points to the possibility of a state’s 
law being expressly preempted because it does not fall within the 
narrow field in which states are allowed to legislate—licensing or 
similar laws. In United States v. Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit held a 
section of an Alabama law preempted because the state said its law 
was not a licensing law and the penalties placed on employers for 
hiring unauthorized workers did not fall within the definition of 
“sanctions.”180 The court reasoned that under IRCA, states are 
preempted from “imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than 
through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit 
or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”181 Thus, in 
this case, it is possible the sanction could have been imposed if it had 
been through a licensing or similar law.182 However, the Eleventh 
Circuit determined that the penalty imposed was not a sanction, and 
thus, that section of the law was preempted.183 The reasoning 
employed by the Eleventh Circuit was similar to that of Justice 
Breyer’s dissent in Whiting in which he stated that the Arizona law 
did not fall under the “licensing and similar laws” exception and 
should be preempted.184 Thus, even though Whiting rejected an 
express preemption challenge to the Arizona law, this could still be a 
successful claim against a different law. 
An implied field preemption challenge is likely to fail because it 
relies on the inference that “Congress ‘left no room’ for 
	
177 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976). 
178 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (“The provisions of this section preempt any State or 
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar 
laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized 
aliens.”). 
179 See supra Parts II.A. and II.B. for discussion of this point. 
180 United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1288–90 (11th Cir. 2012). 
181 Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1289-90 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)). 
182 Id. at 1288–90. 
183 Id. 
184 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987 
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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supplementary state regulation.”185 But IRCA specifically left room 
for states to regulate under licensing or similar laws.186 Thus, 
Congress explicitly left room for states to regulate in this narrow area 
of immigration law. 
An implied conflict preemption challenge is the tactic most likely 
to be successful in challenging immigration laws. Under implied 
conflict preemption, a state law can be preempted in two ways: (1) if 
compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or (2) if the 
state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”187 While the courts 
in Whiting and Lozano reached different results, both opinions 
suggest there are still a few ways in which a state law could be 
preempted on implied conflict grounds. 
First, both cases suggest that if a state law is not closely modeled 
after federal law, then it could be preempted because the state law 
would stand in the way of the federal law’s objectives. In Whiting, the 
Supreme Court upheld the state law because it mirrored federal 
immigration laws on employment.188 The state law in that case 
adopted the definitions and employment verification process directly 
from the federal statute.189 Thus, the state law could not conflict with 
federal law when it followed federal law so closely. In Lozano, the 
Third Circuit struck down the local ordinance precisely because it 
differed from federal law.190 The local ordinance adopted different 
definitions than the federal law.191 Thus, it conflicted with the 
objective of the federal law. This approach suggests the success of a 
preemption challenge lies in how closely the state or local law mirrors 
the federal law. Even though the judgment in Lozano was vacated and 
remanded to the Third Circuit, it is unlikely this will affect the 
conclusion that a successful preemption challenge relies on how 
	
185 Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) 
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
186 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a(h)(2) (“The provisions of this section preempt any State or local 
law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) 
upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized 
aliens.”). 
187 Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. at 713 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
67 (1941)). 
188 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981. 
189 Id. 
190 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 218 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
vacated sub nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). 
191 See id. at 212–18. 
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closely state law mirrors federal law. The court is likely to consider 
how closely the local ordinance mirrors federal law, regardless of the 
final disposition, because that was an important consideration in 
Whiting.192 
Second, court decisions suggest that another way to successfully 
challenge an immigration employment law is to demonstrate the state 
or local law is inconsistent with the purpose of the federal law. Two 
purposes of IRCA are to discourage discrimination in the work 
authorization and hiring process and to lessen the burden on 
employers.193 Thus, a law’s application would be inconsistent with 
federal law if it would lead to discrimination of employees194 or place 
too great a burden on employers.195 However, the Whiting decision 
seemed to reject these two arguments. Even though there are studies 
showing the discriminatory effects of employer use of E-Verify, the 
Court rejected the argument that requiring use of E-Verify would lead 
to discrimination.196 Thus, it is unlikely this argument will be 
successful without more proof of discrimination. 
	
192 See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981. 
193 Lozano, 520 F.3d at 211–12 (“Congress paid considerable attention to the costs 
IRCA would impose on employers and drafted the legislation in a manner that would 
minimize those burdens. . . . Just as importantly, Congress strove to ensure that the 
prohibition against hiring unauthorized aliens would not result in discrimination against 
authorized workers (whether alien or citizen) who appear ‘foreign,’ as Congress feared 
that overcautious employers might incorrectly assume such persons were unauthorized to 
work in the United States. IRCA’s legislative history could not be more plain or emphatic 
about the congressional commitment to preventing this sort of discrimination.” (citation 
omitted)). 
194 See H.R. REP. NO. 99–682(I), at 68 (1986) (“Numerous witnesses over the past three 
Congresses have expressed their deep concern that the imposition of employer sanctions 
will cause extensive employment discrimination against Hispanic-Americans and other 
minority group members . . . . [T]he Committee does believe that every effort must be 
taken to minimize the potentiality of discrimination and that a mechanism to remedy any 
discrimination that does occur must be a part of this legislation . . . . [A]nti-discrimination 
protections are essential to this bill . . . .” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
195 Lozano, 620 F.3d at 213 (“Congress created a comprehensive and carefully balanced 
prosecution and adjudication system, and foremost among its goals in doing so was to 
minimize the burden this system would impose on employers. . . . We therefore cannot 
fathom that Congress intended to tolerate the ‘supplementing’ of its carefully crafted 
system with independent state and local systems, which by their mere existence drastically 
increase burdens on employers.” (citation omitted)); Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 751 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[IRCA] exhaustively details a 
specialized administrative scheme for determining whether an employer has knowingly 
employed an unauthorized alien.”). 
196 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1984–85. 
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While the success of future challenges to immigration employment 
legislation is unclear after Whiting, there is still hope that a 
preemption challenge could be successful. This is demonstrated by 
the decision in United States v. Alabama and other recent cases.197 
B. Tactic Two: Equal Protection Challenges 
The second tactic available to challenge anti-immigrant legislation 
in the employment context is the Equal Protection Clause. In Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause 
applied to noncitizens.198 While noncitizens can challenge laws based 
on Equal Protection grounds, they will have an uphill battle. In most 
cases, courts have refused to strike down laws based on the Equal 
Protection Clause.199 One reason for the failure of Equal Protection 
challenges is the requirement of finding a discriminatory intent 
behind a facially neutral law.200 The Supreme Court has held that the 
Equal Protection Clause applies to aliens and that laws that are neutral 
on their face may violate it if motivated by discriminatory intent.201 
The difficulty of showing discriminatory intent is compounded when 
Congress can pass laws that treat citizens differently from 
noncitizens. This difficulty is clearly seen in the Supreme Court 
decision of Mathews v. Diaz, where the Court held, “In the exercise of 
	
197 See BRUNO ET AL., supra note 126, at 9 n.39 (“However, Whiting should not be 
construed to mean that all state and local E-Verify measures are permissible. See, for 
example, Louisiana Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Jindal, No. 605912, Judgment, 19th 
Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, December 20, 2011 (finding that a 
Louisiana law that required employers to use E-Verify to verify the work authorization of 
all employees was preempted by federal rules and regulations governing E-Verify); 
Positronic Indus., Inc. v. City of Springfield, No. 12-3243-CV-S-RED, Order Granting 
Preliminary Injunction (W.D. Mo., May 10, 2012) (preliminarily enjoining enforcement of 
a municipal ordinance that would have fined employers who did not use E-Verify).”). 
198 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
199 See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86–87 (1976) (rejecting an Equal 
Protection challenge); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 542 (M.D. Pa. 
2007) (finding the plaintiffs could not prove discriminatory intent in passage of the local 
ordinance), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated sub nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). But 
see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376–80 (1971) (holding that a state statute 
denying welfare benefits to resident aliens who have not resided in the United States for a 
specific number of years violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
200 See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 540 (finding that plaintiffs could not prove 
discriminatory intent in passage of the local ordinance); Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of 
Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1742–44 
(2010) (“Plaintiffs will likely lose an equal protection argument because of the law’s 
requirement of discriminatory intent and its presumption against finding it.”). 
201 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373–74. 
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its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress 
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens 
. . . . The fact that an Act of Congress treats aliens differently from 
citizens does not in itself imply that such disparate treatment is 
‘invidious.’”202 Thus, an Equal Protection challenge is a valuable 
tactic to use and is likely to succeed if discriminatory intent can be 
shown. However, if there is no discriminatory intent, the challenge is 
likely to fail. 
C. Tactic Three: Judicial Awareness Arguments 
The third tactic available to challengers of anti-immigrant 
employment laws is a policy-based argument of increased judicial 
awareness, which means that courts should take a more active role 
rather than following the Plenary Power Doctrine. The Plenary Power 
Doctrine gives a great degree of deference to Congress’s decisions in 
the area of immigration.203 One example of the doctrine in action 
comes from Chae Chan Ping, in which Justice Field stated: “If . . . 
[the] legislative department[] considers the presence of foreigners of a 
different race . . . to be dangerous to its peace and security, . . . its 
determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.”204 Another example 
of the Plenary Power Doctrine comes from Fiallo v. Bell in which the 
Court stated: “We observed recently that in the exercise of its broad 
power over immigration and naturalization, ‘Congress regularly 
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.’”205 
Contrary to this doctrine is the idea of judicial awareness. The 
argument is that courts should not simply follow congressional 
legislation without questioning its compliance with constitutional 
principles. Courts should not be satisfied with state regulations that 
“simply require employers to use federal standards,”206 but rather 
courts should look deeper to determine (1) whether federal standards 
	
202 Mathews, 426 U.S. at 79–80. 
203 See, e.g., DeMore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (“[S]ince Mathews, this Court 
has firmly and repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to 
aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”); Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80 
(Congress has the authority to “make rules [regarding noncitizens] that would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711, 
713 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889). See generally 
Johnson, supra note 148, at 6–8. 
204 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. 
205 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80). 
206 Cortez, supra note 165, at 55. 
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are actually being applied and (2) whether federal standards are being 
correctly applied.207 
In the case of immigration employment laws, courts should not 
simply look to an employer’s use of E-Verify as confirmation of 
application of federal standards.208 This is especially true when E-
Verify is not even a standard required for all federal workers—the 
federal government does not mandate use of E-Verify for all 
employers.209 Additionally, the results from a federal database do not 
definitively establish who is in the country legally or not.210 These 
drawbacks are magnified when the federal database relied upon to 
make work-authorization determinations has significant defects.211 
For example, an employer may receive a DHS verification in process 
notice or tentative nonconfirmation and must wait for a manual 
determination of a worker’s work-authorization status.212 Even with a 
manual determination of status, the system is still prone to identity 
and document fraud issues.213 The fact that the federal work-
authorization system implemented by Congress has defects is just one 
reason that courts should step out of the shadow of the Plenary Power 
Doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
While these three tactics all deserve consideration when 
challenging a state or local law, the tactic most likely to be successful 
is that of preemption. Even with these tactics, challenging legislation 
is not a long-term solution to the problems with the country’s 
immigration system. Currently, some of the laws affecting immigrants 
in this country vary from state to state and are immensely complex. 
	
207 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353 (1976) (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 legislation and ballot propositions); League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
208 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 532 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. 
City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011); see Equal Access Educ. v. 
Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655, 662 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
209 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 403(a), 
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-659 (1996); Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 
131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975 (2011); What is E-Verify?, supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
210 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 532; Cortez, supra note 165, at 64. 
211 DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 113; WESTAT CORP., supra note 117. 
212 E-Verify for Employers: The Verification Process, supra note 27; E-Verify for 
Employees: E-Verify Overview, supra note 29. 
213 BRUNO, supra note 118, at 17; Rosenblum, supra note 117, at 5. 
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For these reasons alone, widespread immigration reform is needed.214 
Nathan Cortez summed up these concerns when he stated, “[t]hus, 
state and local attempts to place the burden of determining 
immigration status on state agents, local landlords, or employers fail 
to grasp the complexities of our immigration system.”215 The 
problems with current laws must be addressed, including concerns 
about the strain placed on state and local officials. The Court in 
Whiting placed a large amount of trust in the ability of state and local 
governments to implement systems of work-authorization 
verification. This level of trust is troubling when state governments 
mandate the use of a federal system, E-Verify, which has documented 
flaws and is not even mandatory for all federal employers. Another 
concern is the Whiting majority’s disregard of the strong possibility 
that employers will discriminate against workers. In addition to E-
Verify’s issues, the message from recent cases and congressional 
hearings is that short-term, enforcement-only solutions serve solely as 
a temporary fix for a flawed system in desperate need of repair. 
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